Recently Japan had three outbreaks of avian influenza (AI) in 2004(AI) in , 2005(AI) in and 2007. An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was recorded in early 2004, the first for 79 years, with four farms being infected with HPAI virus subtype H5N1. In 2005, 41 farms were found to be infected with AI virus subtype H5N2. In early 2007, four farms were infected with HPAI virus subtype H5N1 again. In all of these outbreaks, the disease was eradicated without resorting to vaccination, through a campaign of culling, movement control of chickens in areas around infected premises, and intensive clinical and serological surveillance. This paper describes the nature of the outbreaks, the eradication measures implemented, clinical and serological surveillance techniques used, and the possible sources of infection.
Introduction
The poultry industry is an important sector in Japan, producing a gross national product of approximately 561 million yen (1 million yen = approx. US$11,000), 7.9% of the total agricultural product (in 2006) (6, 8) . There are 3,460 layer farms and 2,583 broiler farms keeping 183,224,000 layers and 105,287,000 broilers, respectively. Kanto and Kyushu regions are the leading layer and broiler farming areas, respectively (5).
The geographic advantage of being surrounded by sea, and strict import controls on animals and animal products from countries with exotic disease, had protected Japan from the introduction of major exotic diseases for many years. Japan had been free from highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) since 1925 until an outbreak was diagnosed in 2004. As a result of the policy of non-vaccination against avian influenza (AI) that Japan has adopted, the national poultry population is highly susceptible to the disease.
In accordance with the Domestic Animal Infectious Diseases Control Law and the HPAI eradication guidelines (9) , the eradication measures that should be taken in the event of an HPAI outbreak are based on the following principles:
-immediate depopulation of infected farms -movement controls on chickens and other poultry within a radius of 30 km around the infected farms -intensive surveillance of farms in the movement control areas and on farms epidemiologically related to the infected farms.
Most of these measures are implemented by prefecture veterinary inspectors (veterinarians), with the support of volunteers (farmers, veterinarians, etc.) trained to assist them and private veterinarians, under the guidance and instructions of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). There are 175 prefecture Livestock Hygiene Service Centres (LHSCs) located across Japan, taken by a prefecture inspector on the same day. On 17 February, samples were also sent to the NIAH, where an AI virus subtype H5N1 was identified.
Farm C
A layer farmer in Kyoto prefecture observed high mortality in chickens on 17 February and reported the mortality to an LHSC on 27 February. An inspector of the LHSC visited the farm that day and took samples, which were sent to the NIAH. The 
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Details of the outbreaks
The four infected farms were named A, B, C and D. Information concerning the location of the four farms, the number of susceptible birds kept on the farms, and the date of diagnosis is presented in Table I . The map in Figure  1 indicates the location of these infected farms.
Farm A
A poultry layer farmer in Yamaguchi prefecture found dead chickens on his farm on 28 December 2003 and reported his observation to an LHSC two days later. A veterinary inspector of the LHSC visited the farm and took samples for virus isolation on 9 January 2004. A virus with haemagglutination activity was isolated and sent to the NIAH on 11 January for subtype identification. The virus was confirmed as subtype H5 on 12 January. The virus was identified to be an N1 subtype using the conventional neuraminidase inhibition (NI) assay. The virus was found to be highly pathogenic using the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) standard procedure (12) .
Farm B
Three bantams in a backyard flock in Oita prefecture died on 14 February, and samples from the dead bantams were Note: In addition to the above four outbreaks, 6,880 chickens which were shipped from Farm C were destroyed at a poultry processing plant in Hyogo prefecture 
Control measures implemented
Depopulation of infected farms
Immediately after diagnosis of HPAI, all chickens kept on the four infected farms were destroyed. Depopulation was followed by cleaning and disinfection of the chicken houses. Depopulation and disinfection of the four infected farms were completed by 21 January, 18 February, 22 March and 11 March, respectively. A total of 274,654 chickens were destroyed.
Movement controls
Farm A was quarantined on 9 January 2004 and on 12 January a movement control area with a radius of 30 km was established around the farm. In this area, the movement of poultry and all goods that had the potential to spread the disease was prohibited. 
Surveillance
All chicken farms in the movement control areas were visited by prefecture veterinary inspectors for clinical surveillance. All commercial chicken farms and some hobby chicken farms in the movement control areas were subjected to sampling for serological examination and virus isolation; neither AI antibody nor virus was detected. Faecal samples from wild birds and water samples from ponds and lakes in the movement control areas were also subjected to virus isolation attempts; no AI virus was isolated.
Source of infection
An epidemiological study team formed by the MAFF concluded that the AI virus was probably introduced into Japan by migratory birds from East Asia (2). The fact that there was a slight difference in the Yamaguchi, Oita and Kyoto prefectures suggested that the viruses were introduced into these prefectures on separate occasions from East Asia.
Economic losses
Compensation to farmers for the depopulation of chickens on the four infected farms totalled 380 million yen; this included cleaning and disinfection costs. In addition, 830 million yen was paid to the farmers located in the movement control areas to compensate them for their losses. A total of 3.2 million doses of AI vaccine were imported for emergency use. Consumption of poultry and eggs declined, which may have been due to reports that products from infected farms in Kyoto had been marketed. However, consumption returned to normal within a short period of time after the Food Safety Commission, an independent scientific agency, issued a fact sheet stating that HPAI was not a food-bornedisease (1).
Outbreaks of avian influenza in 2005
Details of the outbreaks
From April 2005, a layer farmer in Ibaraki prefecture observed reduced egg production and increased mortality in one of his flocks. On 24 June, a type A-like influenza virus was isolated as a result of an examination conducted by a private laboratory. The isolated virus was confirmed to be an influenza virus subtype H5N2 by the NIAH on 26 June.
As a result of the surveillance conducted in and around the movement control areas and on the farms epidemiologically related to the infected premises, and the nationwide surveillance conducted from 8 July, an additional 39 layer farms in Ibaraki prefecture and one layer farm in Saitama prefecture were found to be infected. An AI virus subtype H5N2 was isolated from seven of these farms. The other 33 infected farms were detected as a result of serological examinations only. No clinical signs compatible with AI were observed on any of these infected farms. The pathogenicity test conducted by the NIAH showed that the isolated virus was of low pathogenicity. Eight 7-week-old chicks were inoculated with the infective allantoic fluid, in accordance with the OIE standard procedure (12) . Ten days after inoculation all eight chicks were still alive. Figure 2 shows the location of the infected farms.
Control measures implemented
Depopulation of infected farms
All infected farms were subjected to depopulation except for nine farms which were subjected to the 'Farm under quarantine programme' (Fig. 3) . Those nine farms, which were serologically positive only, were considered to have a lower risk of disseminating the virus because they had windowless chicken houses and were manageable on a house-to-house basis. An AI virus was isolated from one of these farms, two months after it was subjected to the 'Farm under quarantine programme'. This farm was subjected to depopulation immediately after the virus isolation.
Depopulation and disinfection of the infected farms were completed by 21 April 2006. A total of 3.36 million chickens were destroyed and 2.42 million chickens were voluntarily culled.
Movement controls
A movement control area of 5 km radius was established around each infected farm immediately after the infection was confirmed. After cleaning and disinfection were completed the control area remained in place for 21 days.
Surveillance
All chicken farms in the movement control areas were visited by prefecture veterinary inspectors for clinical surveillance. All commercial chicken farms in the movement control areas and epidemiologically related farms were subjected to sampling for serological examination and virus isolation.
Nationwide surveillance was also conducted from 8 July until 16 September to confirm how extensively the disease was spreading in Japan (3). Over 60% of layer farms keeping more than 1,000 chickens in Ibaraki and its adjacent prefectures (Fukushima, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba prefectures) and 30% of layer farms keeping more than 1,000 chickens in the rest of Japan were randomly selected and subjected to sampling for serological examination, using the agar-gel immunoprecipitation test. Of a total of 2,409 farms which were subjected to this surveillance, 23 were found to be infected (22 farms in Ibaraki prefecture and one farm in Saitama prefecture).
In addition, faecal samples from wild birds and water samples from ponds and lakes in 20 cities and towns in Ibaraki prefecture were subjected to virus isolation attempts; no AI virus was isolated.
Source of infection
An epidemiological study team formed by the MAFF could not rule out the possibility that a virus or vaccine was illegally introduced into Japan from Central America (4). The isolated virus (A/chicken/Ibaraki/1/2005, GenBank accession No. AB261853) was subtype H5N2 and similar to a virus isolated in Guatemala in 2002 (A/chicken/Guatemala/ 45511-3/00, GenBank accession No. AY497090). There are no migratory birds that are known to migrate from Central America to Japan directly or through Alaska. In addition, an experiment conducted later revealed that chickens were highly susceptible but ducks were not susceptible to the virus isolated from the infected farms, indicating that the virus was not replicating in wild birds.
Economic losses
Compensation to farmers for the depopulation of chickens totalled 1,305 million yen. In addition, the cleaning and disinfection of the infected premises and the destruction of infected chickens cost 1,018 million yen. A further 143 million yen was paid to the farmers located in the movement control areas to compensate them for their losses arising from delayed shipment of eggs and chickens.
A mutual assistance fund had been voluntarily established following the outbreak in 2004, from which 1,480 million yen was paid to those affected farmers who restocked their chicken houses after they were cleaned and disinfected.
During the outbreaks, no big decline of chicken and egg consumption was observed. Information was repeatedly provided stating that AI is not a food-borne disease, and officials of the MAFF regional offices visited shops and supermarkets to ensure that chicken and eggs were properly labelled.
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2007
In January and February 2007, four farms were found to be infected with HPAI virus subtype H5N1: one broiler breeding farm, one broiler farm and one layer farm in Miyazaki prefecture and one layer farm in Okayama prefecture. The disease was eradicated by stamping out the infected farms without resorting to vaccination.
Details of the outbreaks
The four infected farms were named A, B, C and D. Information concerning the location of the four farms, the number of susceptible birds kept on the farms, and the date of diagnosis is presented in Table II . The map in Figure 4 indicates the location of these infected farms.
Farm A
In early January 2007, a broiler breeding farmer in Miyazaki prefecture observed increased mortality and swollen faces in one of his flocks. By 13 January, 3,800 birds of his 12,000 bird flock were dead. A veterinary inspector of the LHSC visited the farm and took samples for virus isolation on 11 January. A virus with haemagglutination activity was isolated and sent to the NIAH on 12 January for subtype identification. The virus was confirmed as subtype H5 on 13 January. The virus was identified to be an N1 subtype using the conventional NI assay. The virus was found to be highly pathogenic using the OIE standard procedure (12).
Farm B
On 22 January, a broiler farmer keeping 53,000 birds in Miyazaki prefecture noticed increased mortality in one of 
Fig. 3 Chart outlining the measures taken on the avian influenza-infected farms in Ibaraki and Saitama prefectures in 2005
After the initial case was detected in June a further 40 farms were found to be infected. The virus was isolated on seven of these farms only; on the other 33 farms infection was detected using serological methods. Nine of the farms that were serologically positive only had windowless chicken houses and therefore had a lower risk of disseminating the virus. These nine farms were subjected to the 'Farm under quarantine programme'
Clinical and serological surveillance 40 infected farms his flocks and reported his observation to his veterinarian. An inspector from the LHSC visited the farm and took samples for diagnosis on 23 January when the mortality rose to 326 birds. The mortality rose to 1,300 by 24 January. On 25 January, AI virus subtype H5 was isolated by the NIAH.
Chickens voluntarily culled All chickens on the farm destroyed
Farm C
On 22 January, a layer farmer in Okayama prefecture found two dead birds in a cage. On 27 January the farmer reported the increased mortality to the LHSC and an inspector of the LHSC visited the farm and took samples, which were subjected to a preliminary test with positive results. An AI virus subtype H5 was isolated on 29 January.
Farm D
On a layer farm in Miyazaki prefecture increased mortality was observed on 30 January. The dead birds had cyanosed combs. A virus with haemagglutination activity was isolated by the LHSC, which was later identified to be H5 subtype by the NIAH on 1 February.
Control measures implemented
Depopulation of infected farms
Immediately after diagnosis of HPAI, all chickens kept on the four infected farms were destroyed. Including the chickens on a farm adjacent to Farm B, a total of 221,905 chickens were destroyed.
Movement controls
Farm A was quarantined on 11 January 2007. On 13 January, a movement control area, with a radius of 10 km, was established around Farm A. The movement control was lifted on 7 February, by which time the Miyazaki prefecture government had completed all clinical and serological surveillance activities on all chicken farms and hobby chicken farms in the movement control area, with negative results. Likewise, movement control areas were established around Farms B, C and D from 25 January to 20 February, from 29 January to 28 February, and from 1 February to 28 February, respectively.
Surveillance
All chicken farms in the movement control areas were visited by prefecture veterinary inspectors for clinical surveillance twice with an interval of ten days. All commercial chicken farms and some hobby chicken farms in the movement control areas were subjected to sampling for serological examination and virus isolation; neither AI antibody nor virus was detected. Faecal samples from wild birds and water samples from ponds and lakes in the movement control areas were also subjected to virus isolation attempts; no AI virus was isolated.
Source of infection
An epidemiological study team formed by the MAFF concluded that the AI virus was probably introduced into Japan by migratory birds from East Asia (7). No AI virus was isolated from a migratory bird, but following extensive surveillance targeting wild birds, a virus subtype H5N1
was isolated from a mountain hawk-eagle found dead in Kumamoto prefecture. The fact that the viruses isolated from the infected farms and the hawk-eagle were genetically similar to those viruses isolated in Mongolia, the Republic of Korea and the People' s Republic of China in recent years (and not similar to the virus isolated from the 2004 outbreaks in Japan) suggested that the viruses were introduced into Miyazaki, Okayama and Kumamoto prefectures from these countries. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the haemagglutinin gene sequence of 
Economic losses
Compensation paid to farmers for the depopulation of 210,000 chickens totalled 106 million yen. The cleaning and disinfection of the infected premises and the destruction of infected chickens cost 1,018 million yen. In addition, 176 million yen was paid to the farmers located in the movement control areas to compensate them for their losses.
Fifty-seven million yen was paid from the mutual assistance fund to those farmers who restocked their chicken houses after they were cleaned and disinfected.
During the outbreaks, information was repeatedly provided stating that HPAI was not a food-borne disease and seeing that activities were conducted to ensure proper labelling of chicken products. As a result, there was no significant decline in chicken and egg consumption.
Conclusion
The 
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